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ADVOCACY AND RHETORIC VS. SCHOLARSHIP 
AND EVIDENCE IN THE DEBATE OVER 
CONTINGENCY FEES: A REPLY TO  
PROFESSOR BRICKMAN 
HERBERT M. KRITZER*
I. INTRODUCTION 
In December 2001 I received a telephone call from a lawyer at a firm 
representing Baxter International, Inc. At that time, Baxter was facing 
lawsuits over a number of dialysis-related deaths that had occurred in 
Europe. Apparently dialysis filters manufactured at a Baxter plant in 
Sweden had been contaminated by a processing chemical resulting in 
adverse consequences when used with dialysis machines. Baxter had 
settled death claims involving ten Spanish patients who had died (for 
$289,000 each), but was facing claims in as many as another 40 cases.1 
American contingency-fee lawyers had begun to contact families in 
Europe and the possibility of lawsuits in the United States was looming,2 
with the prospect of damage payments far greater than roughly $300,000 
per person. 
The lawyer who contacted me was seeking someone to whom his firm, 
or the firm’s client, could refer European journalists who would tell them 
about the problems with American contingency fees. He had in mind 
horror stories, including the supposed likelihood that the lawyers would 
end up with more of the proceeds than their clients. I told the lawyer that I 
would certainly be happy to speak with any journalists who contacted me, 
but I also asked whether the lawyer had visited my website to review my 
writings on contingency fees. When the lawyer indicated that he had not, I 
suggested that he just might want to do so, because he would probably 
determine that I was unlikely to say the kinds of things his firm’s client 
was hoping the journalists would hear. 
 * Professor of Political Science and Law, University of Wisconsin-Madison; B.A. Haverford 
College, Ph.D. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. I would like to thank Stephen Landsman, 
Ted Eisenberg, Sara Parikh, and Robert Peck for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
 1. Bruce Japsen, Baxter Settles in Deaths in Spain, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 29, 2001, at 1; see also 
Emma Daly, Baxter Settles Suit Over Dialysis Deaths in Spain, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2001, at C4. 
 2. Sarah A. Klein, Legal Eagles Eye Wounded Baxter; Lawyers Scouring Globe to Find More 
Filter Victims, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS., Nov. 26, 2001, at 4. 
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I went on to suggest that if he was looking for someone who would 
bad-mouth contingency fees, he might want to contact Professor Lester 
Brickman (“Brickman”). Brickman had established himself as the leading 
proponent of the view that contingency fees were a problem and that they 
needed to be substantially limited so that lawyers would not, supposedly, 
take advantage of naive clients and reap windfall fees.  
I do not know whether the lawyer contacted Professor Brickman or, if 
he did, whether the lawyer indicated that I had made the referral. Professor 
Brickman’s recent article in this law review suggests the kinds of things 
that he might have been expected to say. Regrettably, while his claims 
make good material for journalists, they also demonstrate his inclination to 
let his advocacy distort his scholarship. He also demonstrates a naiveté, 
perhaps resulting from a lack of training, about the norms and practices of 
social science. Rather than critiquing my work from within those norms, 
Brickman falls back on the use of anecdotes and horror stories, which 
while interesting, are the tools of the advocate not the social scientist.3
II. BACKGROUND 
In 1994 the Manhattan Institute, a conservative think tank funded in 
significant part by conservative foundations associated with corporate 
interests, published a proposal to change the way that contingency fees 
operate in the United States.4 Professor Brickman was the lead author of 
that proposal.5 The proposal contained a variety of assertions about 
contingency fees that seemed inconsistent with extant empirical research 
that had provided systematic data about contingency fees and inspired me 
to develop a research project to focus specifically on contingency-fee 
practice in the United States.6 The multi-faceted research project went into 
 3. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Lawrence C. Marshall & Frances Kahn Zemans, Rule 11: Moving 
Beyond the Cosmic Anecdote, 75 JUDICATURE 269 (1992). 
 4. Tamar Lewin, Three Conservative Foundations Are in the Throes of Change, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 20, 2001, at 30. On the role of the Manhattan Institute in promoting “tort reform,” see Kenneth J. 
Chesebro, Galileo’s Retort: Peter Huber’s Junk Scholarship, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1637, 1707–22 
(1993). 
 5. LESTER BRICKMAN ET AL., RETHINKING CONTINGENCY FEES (1994) [hereinafter BRICKMAN, 
RETHINKING CONTINGENCY FEES]. 
 6. In preparing for that research project, I wrote a paper, never published but available for many 
years on my web site, that sought to bring together any and all available information about the nature 
of contingency fees. See HERBERT M. KRITZER, RHETORIC AND REALITY . . . USES AND ABUSES . . . 
CONTINGENCIES AND CERTAINTIES: THE AMERICAN CONTINGENT FEE IN OPERATION, (Univ. of Wis. 
L. Sch., Inst. for Legal Studies, Disputes Processing Research Program, Working Paper No. 12-2, 
1996), at http://www.polisci.wisc.edu/~kritzer/research/contfee/rhetoric.pdf [hereinafter KRITZER, 
RHETORIC AND REALITY]. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss2/5
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the field in the fall of 1995 with funding from the National Science 
Foundation,7 and the data I collected served as the central basis of the 
material presented in my 2002 article in this law review entitled Seven 
Dogged Myths Concerning Contingency Fees.8 Because that article 
challenged many of the presumptions underlying Professor Brickman’s 
many-year crusade, his recent attack in this law review on my article—and 
the research that underlies it—did not come as a surprise.9
Professor Brickman and I approach the question of contingency fees 
from very different perspectives. He describes his concerns as flowing 
from problems that he sees in the ethics of contingency fees and the 
lawyers who work on that basis.10 My interest in contingency fees follows 
from a broad interest in empirical research on civil justice11 and a 
particular concern about access to justice. To me, the first question is 
understanding how contingency fees work in practice, and I try to answer 
this question from the ground rather than from the ivory tower of an office 
in a law school in Manhattan. My research has involved scientific, 
systematic surveys of contingency-fee practitioners; surveys of clients and 
potential clients of contingency-fee practitioners; semi-structured 
interviews of contingency-fee practitioners and those who work opposite 
those practitioners (insurance adjusters and insurance defense lawyers); 
and extended observation of contingency-fee practitioners going about 
their day-to-day work.  
Professor Brickman decidedly dislikes the results of my research 
because they do not support the claims he makes in calling for changes to 
the workings of the American contingency-fee system. In attacking my 
work, he misquotes me, misrepresents what I have reported, makes 
assertions about what I am and am not aware of, and then tries to 
 7. NSF Grant No. SBR-9510976; additional funding was provided by the Research Committee 
of the University of Wisconsin Graduate School. 
 8. Herbert M. Kritzer, Seven Dogged Myths Concerning Contingency Fees, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 
739 (2002) [hereinafter Kritzer, Seven Dogged Myths]. 
 9. Lester Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates of Contingency-Fee Lawyers: Competing Data and 
Non-Competitive Fees, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 653 (2003) [hereinafter Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates]. 
 10. Id. at 655–60; see Lester Brickman, ABA Regulation of Contingency Fees: Money Talks, 
Ethics Walks, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 247 (1996); Lester Brickman, Contingency Fee Abuses, Ethical 
Mandates, and the Disciplinary System: The Case Against Case-By-Case Enforcement, 53 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1339 (1996); Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet without 
the Prince of Denmark? 37 UCLA L. REV. 29 (1989) [hereinafter Brickman, Contingent Fees]; see 
also BRICKMAN, RETHINKING CONTINGENCY FEES, supra note 5. 
 11. I have been conducting empirical research on civil justice for over twenty-five years and 
have considered a broad range of topics from guardianship processes, to notification in class actions, to 
the use and impact of Rule 11 sanctions. All of my research articles can be found on my website at 
http://www.polisci.wisc.edu/~kritzer/research/research.htm. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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demonstrate with other evidence that my findings could not be correct. In 
this brief response, I point out the errors Professor Brickman has made in 
his supposed critique. 
III. DISTORTIONS AND OMISSIONS 
A. The Nature of the Wisconsin Contingency-Fee Study 
The core of my own empirical research has been conducted in 
Wisconsin because that is where I teach and live. My Wisconsin 
Contingency-Fee Study involved observation of lawyers over a three 
month period, a survey of Wisconsin practitioners producing 511 
responses,12 semi-structured interviews with Wisconsin contingency-fee 
practitioners and their “opponents” (insurance adjusters and defense 
lawyers), a general survey of the Wisconsin population, and a survey of 
Wisconsin injury victims who were the recipients of direct mail 
solicitations.13 The research was funded by the National Science 
Foundation after peer review by experts in social-science research related 
to legal phenomenon.  
Despite the careful scientific design of this research, Brickman alleges 
that my findings about what I term effective hourly rates (the fee lawyers 
receive divided by the hours devoted to the case) are based in part on my 
“own assertedly ‘unscientific study’ (‘The Wisconsin Contingency Fee 
Study’).”14 He asserts that I referred to my “‘Wisconsin Contingency Fee 
Study’ done in 1995-1996 as an ‘unscientific survey.’”15 While these 
claims might be good rhetoric, they are at best questionable scholarship. 
Brickman attributes these supposed acknowledgments of a lack of 
scientific basis to my research (and, hence, to my findings) to an article 
published in the DePaul Law Review.16 That article reported the first 
analyses of effective hourly rates based on my scientific survey of 
Wisconsin. The article drew on other sources of data to bolster the survey 
results—such as preliminary data I had assembled from a variety of 
 12. Brickman incorrectly states that the data from my survey of Wisconsin lawyers was 
“provided by 1192 Wisconsin lawyers.” Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 9, at 676. I 
received responses from additional lawyers telling me that they did not do contingency fee work or, in 
a few cases, declining to participate in the survey. 
 13. This last component was not a formal part of my research but was conducted simultaneously 
with it, and I had some input into its design. 
 14. Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 9, at 668 (footnote omitted). 
 15. Id. at 676. 
 16. Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal Practice, 47 
DEPAUL L. REV. 267 (1998) [hereinafter Kritzer, Wages of Risk]. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss2/5
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sources, published studies of the economics of legal practice, and 
unpublished data from several of those studies.17 In one part of the article, 
I tried to assess the issues that might be raised by the fact that many 
contingency-fee lawyers do not keep time records and hence had to 
estimate the amount of time they spent on the cases about which they gave 
me data.18 In making that assessment, I used some data I had collected 
when planning the larger study (from lawyers who did keep time records 
and agreed to consult those records). I describe those data (and only those 
data) as based on an “unscientific survey.”19  
It is instructive to quote two successive paragraphs from the DePaul 
Law Review article: 
 When I first thought about conducting the Wisconsin 
Contingency Fee Study, I had the impression that virtually no 
lawyers working on a contingency fee basis maintained time 
records. In conversations with several local attorneys, I became 
aware that there were at least some lawyers who did keep track of 
their time while doing work on a contingency fee basis. Drawing 
upon a list of attorneys who were likely to be in practices which 
required them to track their contingency fee time, I conducted an 
unscientific survey. I asked these attorneys to provide me with 
information on contingency fee cases closed over a recent time 
period. These lawyers provided me with information on a total of 
ninety-two cases (with gross fees received ranging from $0 to 
$910,000 and lawyer effort ranging from three hours to 7,000 
hours). As before, dividing net fee by lawyer hours produced an 
estimate of the effective hourly rate. The median was $125; the 
mean effective hourly rate was $189. 
 In the sample from the scientific survey, there were 151 cases 
with information on effective hourly rates for which the lawyers 
reported having consulted their case files and that those files 
contained time records. This represents only seventeen percent of 
the entire sample used to conduct the Wisconsin Contingency Fee 
Study and, consequently, the data needs to be treated with caution. 
For these 151 cases, the median effective hourly rate was $111 and 
the mean was $170. Looking separately at the unfiled, filed, and 
 17. Id. at 276–84. 
 18. Id. at 300–02. 
 19. Id. at 302. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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tried cases, the respective medians/means are $146/$224 (n=51), 
$109/$170 (n=61), and $95/$99 (n=39).20
As a scholar, I find it very troubling that Professor Brickman used the 
reference to a preliminary “unscientific survey” in the first paragraph 
quoted above to brand the entire study “unscientific” when the very next 
paragraph refers specifically to the scientific survey upon which the core 
analysis was based. 
B. Contingency Fee Specialists and Others Who Charge Contingency 
Fees 
Professor Brickman claims that I have failed to represent the reality of 
contingency fees accurately because I did not focus on personal injury 
specialists: “If Kritzer had restricted the data upon which he based his 
calculations of effective hourly rates to lawyers who represented tort 
claimants exclusively on a contingent-fee bases, or at least very nearly so, 
the comparative data elicited would likely have been far different.”21 This 
argument seems to presume that the vast majority of contingency-fee cases 
are handled by such specialists. My estimate is that about half the cases 
handled on a contingency fee basis in Wisconsin are handled by lawyers 
who characterize the “primary nature” of their practices as “personal 
injury plaintiffs’” work.22 Focusing exclusively on such specialists then 
would have missed about half of the contingency-fee universe. 
More important, however, is that I in fact do report data for specialists 
in personal injury plaintiffs’ work. For reasons of space these data were 
not reported in the article in this law review. They can be found in the 
DePaul Law Review article that Professor Brickman liberally cites.23 
While higher than other lawyers, the differences are not extreme: the 
median effective hourly rate for the specialist is about $160 per hour 
compared to about $115 per hour for other lawyers; specialists get more of 
the lucrative cases (or are able to handle larger cases more efficiently), 
 20. Id. at 301–02 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
 21. Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 9, at 676–77. 
 22. An important, unanswered question is whether a much higher proportion of contingency-fee 
cases is handled by “personal injury plaintiffs specialists” in other states. In a study of the personal 
injury bar in Cook County, Illinois, Sara Parikh found that only 50–60% of lawyers identified from the 
court records as handling personal injury cases were members of the Illinois Trial Lawyers 
Association. Sara Parikh, Professionalism and Its Discontents: A Study of Social Networks in the 
Plaintiff’s Personal Injury Bar 48–49 (2001) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois at 
Chicago) (on file with author) [hereinafter Parikh, Professionalism and Its Discontents]. 
 23. Kritzer, Wages of Risk, supra note 16, at 296 (Figure 3). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss2/5
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with the 75th percentile effective hourly rate falling at $330 per hour 
compared to $200–$250 per hour for most groups of nonspecialists.24 
More detail comparing various groups of lawyers is in my book25 and can 
be found in a paper posted on my website since 2002.26
C. Absence of Cases Involving Large Fees 
Brickman asserts that my findings must be biased because of the 
alleged absence of cases involving large fees: “Finally, it is clear from the 
data that Kritzer used that not a single responding attorney reported a 
multi-million dollar fee, or even multi-hundred-thousand dollar fees 
despite the fact that such fees in tort cases are not infrequent.”27 I have no 
idea how Brickman arrives at this conclusion about the frequency of such 
fees. Brickman’s assertion in this regard demonstrates a lack of 
understanding of how data are analyzed and what particular analyses do 
and do not show. 
How is it “clear from the data . . . that not a single responding attorney 
reported a multi-million dollar fee, or even multi-hundred-thousand dollar 
fees”? I do not include maximum values in reporting my data because 
experience says that if I do, someone will grab onto that information and 
fail to report the central tendency information that is more relevant.28 In 
fact, the data I collected include several fees of $1 million or more. 
Similarly, Brickman claims that “it is a mathematical certainty that 
none of the attorneys that Kritzer surveyed reported high-end contingency 
fees.”29 In fact there most certainly are high end (high effective hourly 
rate) fees in my data set. About 4% of the cases (unweighted) produced 
four figure ($1,000 or more) effective-hourly rates, with the highest being 
$4,473. There were no five figure ($10,000 or more) effective hourly rates. 
Professor Brickman presumably believes that such fees are common. Of 
 24. Id. 
 25. HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE LEGAL 
PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 194, 198, 200 (2004) [hereinafter KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, 
AND REWARDS]. 
 26. Herbert M. Kritzer, What Are Contingency Fees Really Like? (Mar. 2002) (paper prepared 
for the 2002 F. Hodge O’Neal Corp. and Sec. Law Symp.), at http://www.polisci.wisc.edu/~kritzer/ 
research/contfee/ilep.pdf [hereinafter Kritzer, What Are Contingency Fees Really Like]. 
 27. Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 9, at 678. 
 28. When I was working on a study of Rule 11 sanctions, see Lawrence C. Marshall, Herbert M. 
Kritzer & Frances Kahn Zemans, The Use and Impact of Rule 11, 86 NORTHWESTERN L. REV. 943 
(1992), I received a call from a reporter at Businessweek. The reporter wanted to ask me only one 
question: what was the largest sanction we had found in our study? In fact, I had not even looked to 
see what that figure was, because my interests are not in the atypical but in the typical. 
 29. Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 9, at 677 n.74. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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course, the alternate interpretation is that five-figure fees are extremely 
rare, and hence it is not surprising that no such fees appeared in my data 
set.30
Very large cases and the resulting large fees loom large in the public’s 
mind and apparently in Professor Brickman’s mind as well. This is not 
surprising given that the media focuses on the big cases, as amply shown 
by research comparing news reports and systematic data on verdicts.31 The 
fact that large cases and the accompanying large fees are made highly 
visible by the media does not mean that they comprise a significant 
fraction of contingency fee cases.  
In fact, all statistical evidence shows that very large cases that produce 
big fees are a very small fraction of contingency fee cases. For example, a 
quick analysis of bodily injury claims from the 1997 Insurance Research 
Council (“IRC”) Closed-Claims Study of Auto Injury Claims shows that 
only three cases involving attorney representation (out of a total of 22,826 
such cases—that is 0.013%) involved payments of a million dollars or 
more; in other words, there is not a single case in the closed-claim study 
where the lawyer received a fee of a million dollars or more.32 In some 
ways, this is not surprising because relatively few individuals have 
insurance coverage exceeding $1 million dollars.33
Texas is often held out as a state where the plaintiffs’ bar is especially 
aggressive and successful. The Texas Department of Insurance (“TDI”) 
publishes an annual report analyzing closed-claims involving commercial-
liability insurance where the insurance limits are much less likely to limit 
the size of claims to under $1 million.34 The data upon which these reports 
 30. Professor Brickman seems unable to resist rhetorical flourishes, even to the point that he 
believes he can read my mind, and know what I am and am not aware of: “Kritzer’s lack of awareness 
of the incidence of medical cost build-up as a function of contingent-fee claiming.” Id. at 674 n.61. 
How does Brickman know what I am and am not aware of? In fact, in my recent book I discuss the 
role of contingency-fee lawyers in directing clients to get medical providers and medical care; see 
KRITZER, RISK, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS, supra note 25, at 114–18; while I have no doubt that 
there are lawyers (and clients and medical providers) who encourage unnecessary medical treatment, I 
show that there are also good reasons why represented injury victims might have received more 
medical treatment than unrepresented injury victims. 
 31. See Oscar G. Chase, Helping Jurors Determine Pain and Suffering Awards, 23 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 763, 772–74 (1995); Daniel S. Bailis & Robert J. MacCoun, Estimating Liability Risks with the 
Media as Your Guide, 80 JUDICATURE 64 (1996); WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, 
DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS 165–68 (2004). 
 32. The figures above are from my own analysis of the IRC data set. See INS. RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, INJURIES IN AUTO ACCIDENTS: AN ANALYSIS OF AUTO INSURANCE CLAIMS (1999) 
[hereinafter IRC, INJURIES IN AUTO ACCIDENTS]. 
 33. Based on my own analysis, only about 1% of the cases in the 1997 IRC data set involved 
bodily-injury policies with coverage of $1 million or more. 
 34. TDI has published these reports since at least 1988; reports starting with 1997 are available 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss2/5
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are based can be obtained from the TDI website.35 Using the 1997 data and 
the corresponding report, one finds that payments were made in 30,471 
claims under commercial auto liability policies; a total of 58 of these 
claims involved payments of $1 million dollars or more.36 Across all lines 
of commercial liability insurance in Texas, payments were made in 58,168 
claims; 248 involved payments of $1 million or more.37 Assuming a one-
third contingency fee, a case would need a payout of $3 million or more to 
produce a $1 million fee; a total of 45 out of 58,168 commercial liability 
claims in Texas in 1997 produced such payments; assuming a 40% fee, the 
number of million dollar fees increases to 65. This is a sizable number of 
such fees in absolute terms, but represents (using the higher contingency-
fee percentage) about one-tenth of one percent of the commercial liability 
claims closed with payments.38
An area where one might expect there to be a large proportion of very 
large fees is medical malpractice. In a study of over 21,000 paid medical 
malpractice claims in Florida closed during the period between 1990-
2003, Neil Vidmar and his colleagues found that only 4% involved 
payments of $1 million or more. Only 0.6% involved payments of $2.5 
million or more (which would produce seven-figure fees if the percentage 
were 40%).39
I know of no evidence that a large proportion of contingency-fee cases 
produce seven figure (or even six figure) fees.40 A 1996 U.S. Justice 
on the TDI website at: http://www.tdi.state.tx.us/general/forms/tdirpts.html#pandc. 
 35. Texas Department of Insurance, TDI Online Reports and Studies, at 
http://www.tdi.state.tx.us/general/forms/tdirpts.html#closed (last visited Aug. 29, 2004). 
 36. This figure is based on my own analysis of the TDI data. See 1997 TEX. DEPT. OF INS. TEX. 
LIABILITY INS. CLOSED CLAIM ANN. REP., available at http://www.tdi.state.tx.us/general/pdf/ 
taccar97.pdf. Some fraction of these cases involve property damage only, but the Texas data do not 
split out this subset. 
 37. See id. 
 38. The most recent report and data are for 2001. 2001 TEX. DEPT. OF INS. TEX. LIABILITY INS. 
CLOSED CLAIM ANN. REP., available at http://www.tdi.state.tx.us/general/pdf/taccar01.pdf [hereinafter 
TDI, 2001 CLOSED CLAIM ANN. REP.]. The comparable figures for 2001 are 303 settled claims of $1 
million or more out of 62,810 overall; for commercial auto liability insurance claims, there were 65 
settled claims of $1 million or more out of a total of 36,016 claims; 71 claims would have produced 
fees of $1 million or more assuming a one-third contingency fee, and 86 claims would have produced 
fees of $1 million or more assuming a 40% contingency fee. See id. 
 39. Email correspondence between Neil Vidmar and Herbert M. Kritzer (Sept. 18 & 19, 2004) 
(on file with author). The report of the analysis from which these figures are drawn is forthcoming in 
Neil Vidmar et al., Uncovering the “Invisible” Profile of Medical Malpractice Litigation: Insights 
from Florida, DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming 2004 or 2005). 
 40. Repeatedly through his article Brickman makes reference to class actions and their impact on 
contingency fees. Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 9, at 664, 696, 712–13. Undoubtedly 
class actions produce large fees in absolute terms; however, class actions (and the lawyers who litigate 
class action suits) are a very small piece of the contingency-fee world. My study, and my writings on 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Department study of jury verdicts in 45 of the 75 largest counties in the 
United States found that only 3.0% of jury verdicts for plaintiffs in auto 
accident cases produced awards of $1 million or more and only 8.4% were 
$250,000 or more.41 Even in medical-malpractice cases, only 22.1% of 
verdicts were $1 million or more and only 6.1% of plaintiffs’ verdicts 
came in medical-malpractice cases compared to 61.5% in auto-accident 
cases.42  
D. Top-Tier Lawyers 
In several places Brickman implies that I have finally “come to 
recognize the existence of a top tier of contingent-fee lawyers earning 
substantially higher effective hourly rates than the rest of the pack.”43 I 
have not “come to recognize” this; I was fully aware of this at the 
beginning of my contingency-fee study. The first paper from the project, 
which Brickman liberally cites, observed: 
One last issue here worth noting is the likelihood of what I call 
skimming. That is, in some states there is a small group of lawyers 
who, due to reputation or some other factor, are able to be 
extremely selective in the cases they accept. The result of such 
selectivity might be the consistent generation of extremely high 
effective hourly rates.44
contingency fees, do not specifically address class actions. Fees in class actions are regulated through 
very different mechanisms, and including them along with the cases I look at is like trying to stuff a 
watermelon into a grocery sack containing a bunch of grapes: they do not mix. Recent work on fees in 
class actions indicate that the average fee percentages are well below the supposed “standard” 33% 
and that the percentage declines as the size of the case increases. See Theodore Eisenberg and 
Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements: An Empirical Study, 1 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 27, 51–54 (2004). 
 41. CAROL J. DEFRANCES & MARIKA F.X. LITRAS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 173426, CIVIL 
TRIAL CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 1996, at 8 (1999), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ctcvlc96.pdf [hereinafter DEFRANCES & LITRAS, CIVIL TRIAL 
CASES AND VERDICTS]. This study was replicated for 2001, and found similar results, although the 
published report of the study does not separate out awards in jury and bench trials. See THOMAS H. 
COHEN & STEVEN K. SMITH, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 202803, CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND VERDICTS 
IN LARGE COUNTIES, 2001, at 5 (2004), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ 
ctcvlc01.pdf [hereinafter, COHEN & SMITH, CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 
2001]. 
 42. DEFRANCES & LITRAS, CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND VERDICTS, supra note 41, at 8. 
 43. Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 9, at 687 n.122, 699. 
 44. See KRITZER, RHETORIC AND REALITY, supra note 6, at 54. Since that time, I have written 
about the growing stratification in the plaintiffs’ bar both in the U.S. and in England; see Herbert M. 
Kritzer, From Litigators of Ordinary Cases to Litigators of Extraordinary Cases: Stratification of the 
Plaintiffs’ Bar in the Twenty-first Century, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 219 (2001); and Herbert M. Kritzer, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss2/5
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Brickman seems to believe that this top tier of lawyers comprises a 
substantial portion of the contingency-fee bar.45 I believe it represents a 
small segment of the bar, even among personal injury specialists. One 
place that is well-known for having such a top tier is Chicago, with the 
likes of Phil Corboy and Bob Clifford. A recent study of the plaintiffs’ bar 
in Chicago identified a total of eleven lawyers falling into a top tier of 
“elite” lawyers (with an acknowledgment that some members of this elite 
may have been overlooked); at the time of the study, 1600 lawyers in the 
Chicago area belonged to the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association (“ITLA”), 
the association of plaintiffs’ lawyers in Illinois.46 Even if one extended the 
tier down to include the top 20%, the great bulk of personal-injury 
specialists do not fall into this upper tier; even though those plaintiffs’ 
attorneys in the “upper tier” (top 20%) do handle significant cases and 
earn occasional very large fees.47 Equally important, this researcher 
The Fracturing Legal Profession: The Case of Plaintiffs’ Personal Injury Lawyers, 8 INT’L J. LEGAL 
PROF. 225 (2001). 
 45. As best I can tell, his only basis for this is that Stephan Daniels and Joanne Martin, in their 
study of the Texas plaintiffs’ bar, divide lawyers into four groups of approximately equal size 
depending on the lawyers’s reports of their average case value. This procedure will by its nature 
stratify by case size. It is also extremely important to note that Daniels and Martin used average case 
value not median case value; this means that a small number of very large cases in a relatively low 
volume practice can result in a large average case value. See Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, It Was 
the Best of Times, It Was the Worst of Times: The Precarious Nature of Plaintiff’s Practice in Texas, 
80 TEX. L. REV. 1781, 1786 (2002). 
 46. Parikh, Professionalism and Its Discontents, supra note 22, at 48 n.1. 
 47. In personal correspondence, the author of the Chicago study, Dr. Sara Parikh, reported the 
following:  
There are about 2100 plaintiff personal injury lawyers in Chicago (estimated number from the 
Chicago Lawyers project). This means that the elite comprise only about 1% of all 
practitioners. These elite (who include Corboy, Clifford, and the like) are stars by any 
measure. They handle mostly high-value cases, often specializing in medical malpractice 
cases. They have a career high average verdict or settlement of $26 million. They are leaders 
in trial lawyers associations, contribute heavily to democratic politics, etc.  
 However, through my random sample of personal injury case filings, I also found a larger 
group of “high-end” practitioners. They look much like the elite in many respects. They 
handle higher value complex cases (often medical malpractice), and are invested in the 
profession. While still respectable, their career high average is substantially lower (mean of 
$8 million; median of $4 million). Finally, the bulk of personal injury attorneys identified 
through my random sample are “low-end” practitioners who handle small cases (in the $10–
30,000 range). They tend to handle a high volume of routine auto cases. They have a career 
high average of about $500,000. Based on a number of factors, I estimated that the elite 
comprise approximately 1% of PI lawyers in Chicago; the remaining high-end about 19%, 
and the low-end 80%. . . . Yet, even the elite and the high-end firms must take in medium-
smaller value cases to survive. There are simply not enough big cases to sustain a whole 
practice, and the competition for the biggest cases is pretty tough. So, while their big cases 
can get quite big, the bulk of their practice is in more moderate cases. 
E-mail from Sara Parikh to Herbert M. Kritzer (Mar. 1, 2004) (on file with author). 
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identified lawyers to interview by sampling court cases and found that 
only half the lawyers she identified belonged to ITLA compared to all but 
one of the lawyers she identified as “elite.”48
E. Comparative Returns of Contingency-Fee Work 
Brickman asserts that I argue that “contingency fees in personal injury 
cases generate hourly rates of return that are substantially the same as 
hourly based rates.”49 Certainly I do argue that typical contingency-fee 
returns are not wildly out of line with hourly rates. However, that is not 
the same as saying that they are “substantially the same.” 
I go to some length to lay out the comparison. My analysis shows that a 
small segment of cases produces very high returns, and this pushes the 
average return well above the hourly rates most lawyers charge.50 
However, this represents a small segment of cases (perhaps 10% or less); 
omitting the 10% leaves contingency-fee lawyers with a modest “profit” 
margin over the typical hourly rate which is easily justified by the 
additional services provided by contingency-fee lawyers (e.g., advancing 
the costs of the case, deferring payment for services, and insurance against 
the uncertainties inherent in tort claims and other litigation).51 It is also the 
case that a very significant proportion of cases yield returns well under the 
typical hourly rate, and this is true even omitting those cases for which no 
return is obtained. 
IV. OTHER ISSUES AND ASSERTIONS 
A. Representativeness of Wisconsin 
A major theme in Brickman’s critique is that Wisconsin is not 
representative of “national lawyers’ fees” and hence the results of my 
Wisconsin survey should be dismissed.52 I would be the first to admit that 
 48. Parikh, Professionalism and Its Discontents, supra note 22, at 48–49. 
 49. Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 9, at 665.  
 50. Kritzer, Seven Dogged Myths, supra note 8, at 771–72. 
 51. Brickman claims that I do this to “combat the apparently unexpectedly result of a high 
mean,” and that I “offered no explanation for such an exclusion beyond that [my] estimates are 
otherwise ‘greatly influenced by relatively small numbers of extremely profitable cases’”. Brickman, 
Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 9, at 677 n.74. I explain very clearly that I do this to understand the 
importance of the skew inherent in the distribution. See THOMAS H. WONNACOTT & RONALD J. 
WONNACOTT, INTRODUCTORY STATISTICS 536–39 (5th ed. 1990). Moreover, I also present the results 
without trimming the top 10% so that readers are able to draw their own conclusions about the patterns 
in the data. 
 52. Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 9, at 679. 
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Wisconsin is not Texas, New York, or California. But then, who would 
argue that Texas, New York, or California is representative of the United 
States as a whole? 
Brickman asserts that my Wisconsin data are unrepresentative, 
“[b]ecause contingency fees are generally higher in urban areas.”53 I am 
not sure how he knows that this is the case. In fact, some of the highest 
contingency fees have come from trials in nonurban areas such as 
Alabama and Mississippi.54 It may well be that more cases arise in urban 
areas,55 but it is not clear why that would affect the contingency-fee 
income of lawyers unless personal-injury specialists are located only in 
urban areas (although particularly in urban areas, many specialists handle 
small value, routine cases56). Stephen Daniels and Joanne Martin report 
mean and median jury verdicts for 80 different jurisdictions (in 16 states), 
some urban and some rural, in their book Civil Juries and the Politics of 
Reform. While there appears to be something of a tendency for the largest 
means to come from urban jurisdictions, the pattern is far from consistent; 
in some states, the largest mean comes from a nonurban district, and the 
largest median comes from nonurban districts in a larger number of 
states.57 Drawing on a 1996 study of tort verdicts in 45 of the 75 largest 
counties in the United States, there does appear to be a tendency for the 
mean and median verdicts to increase as population increases, although the 
link to median verdicts is much weaker than the link to mean verdicts.58 
 53. Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 9, at 670–71. 
 54. See George L. Priest, Punitive Damages Reform: The Case of Alabama, 56 LA. L. REV. 825 
(1996) (describing the very large punitive awards coming from several rural counties in Alabama). In 
the late 1980s, I contemplated a research project on the “propensity to sue” that would have included a 
county in east-central Alabama as one of the research sites. As part of my preliminary work for this 
project (which never came to fruition), I spoke with the trial judge in this county. He told me that the 
local juries were inclined to give very large awards in cases involving corporate defendants from 
outside the local area. 
 55. There is evidence that a larger portion of injury victims in large cities—who claim 
compensation—employ an attorney than is true for injury victims in medium or small cities, or rural 
areas. See INS. RESEARCH COUNCIL, PAYING FOR AUTO INJURIES: A CONSUMER PANEL SURVEY OF 
AUTO ACCIDENT VICTIMS 28 (1994) [hereinafter IRC, PAYING FOR AUTO INJURIES 1994]; INS. 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, PAYING FOR AUTO INJURIES: A CONSUMER PANEL SURVEY OF AUTO ACCIDENT 
VICTIMS 47 (1999) [hereinafter IRC, PAYING FOR AUTO INJURIES 1999]. However, this also might 
mean that attorneys in nonurban areas are more selective, and take only cases with higher returns. 
 56. See supra, note 47. 
 57. See STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM 84–
86 (1995) [hereinafter DANIELS & MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES]. 
 58. See MIRIKA F.X. LITRAS ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 179769, TORT TRIALS AND 
VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 1996, at 13–14 (2000), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ 
pdf/ttvlc96.pdf. From the tables in Appendix A and Appendix B I computed the Spearman rank order 
correlation between county population and mean and median final award amounts (including punitive 
damages); the respective correlations were .536 and .348 
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However, there is no way of determining whether this reflects (1) 
differences in jury behavior, (2) differences in the kinds of cases arising in 
urban areas, or (3) differences in which cases lawyers choose to bring to 
trial. 
Brickman notes that fewer Wisconsin accident victims file lawsuits 
than do those in many other states;59 effective hourly rates tend to be 
higher in cases settled without filing than in cases that are filed in court 
because lawyers do not have to do all the tasks associated with filing, and 
formal discovery never starts. Brickman also notes that fewer Wisconsin 
auto-injury claimants have lawyer representation, which could well 
indicate that Wisconsin lawyers are more conservative and take only larger 
cases—and hence have higher potential fee yields.60 Brickman argues that 
jury verdicts in Wisconsin tend to be on the low side;61 while I have 
doubts about Brickman’s data source for this point,62 data that I have more 
trust in would also tend to support this assertion.63  
Still, does this mean that Wisconsin is unrepresentative in terms of 
effective hourly rates earned by contingency-fee lawyers? In my article in 
this law review, I went to some length to demonstrate that the Wisconsin 
results in this regard are not inconsistent with what we can learn from 
other studies.64 Brickman takes note of the fact that I also report data from 
the RAND Civil Justice Reform Act (“CJRA”) study,65 but he fails to 
grasp the import of the comparison.66 When I limit the Wisconsin cases to 
those that most resemble the cases in the RAND data, I find that the 
effective hourly rates obtained by lawyers in Wisconsin are higher than 
those reported in the national RAND data.67
 59. Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 9, at 683. 
 60. Id. at 682. 
 61. Id. at 684. 
 62. See infra notes 54–58 and accompanying text. 
 63. See DEFRANCES & LITRAS, CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND VERDICTS, supra note 41, at 22. 
 64. Kritzer, Seven Dogged Myths, supra note 8, at 769–72. 
 65. See Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 9, at 685 & n.105. 
 66. Brickman also claims that I “revised upward” my previous calculations. Brickman, Effective 
Hourly Rates, supra note 9, at 686. I do revise the previous calculations somewhat (compared to the 
results I reported in the DePaul Law Review article) by refining my weighting scheme. However, 
Brickman misses the key point which is that the kinds of cases in the RAND study differ from the 
overall Wisconsin study (i.e., only filed cases and only cases involving a certain level of damages); for 
purposes of comparison, I try to zero in on the subset of Wisconsin cases that are most comparable to 
the federal cases in the RAND data.  
 67. Kritzer, Seven Dogged Myths, supra note 8, at 772 tbl.8. I do not make an argument in the 
text that Wisconsin fees are higher, but simply that they “are not significantly out of line with patterns 
that one would expect to find from national studies.” Id. at 771. 
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While I have done everything I can to assess the representativeness of 
the data I have collected from Wisconsin, that does not mean that evidence 
from other states, or from a national sample, could not show different 
patterns. However, simply noting the possible unrepresentativeness of a 
carefully designed study does little to advance either scholarly inquiry or 
the policy debate. It is unproductive to dismiss what we do know based on 
the fact that it is not based on the whole universe of lawyers. One rarely 
learns everything one needs to know about a social problem (or disease or 
other medical condition) from one study. But if each solid study is 
dismissed as piecemeal or unrepresentative of the complete universe, we 
would never get anywhere. If Professor Brickman were truly concerned 
about getting good, broad-based data, he and the organizations that back 
him would support carefully designed, systematic data collection on a 
broad scale such as I have done in Wisconsin. I would challenge Professor 
Brickman to urge the Manhattan Institute to join with the Roscoe Pound 
Foundation or Public Citizen or similar groups to support a national 
replication of my study.  
B. Texas Data 
In addition, Brickman erroneously questions something he calls the 
“Texas data.” In discussing a Texas case where there may well have been 
questionable fees charged, he states “[i]t is a mathematical certainty that 
the 1992 Texas data relied upon by Kritzer for substantiating his estimates 
of effective hourly rates of contingency-fee lawyers did not include those 
$1.8 million fees.”68 I believe he is referring to a table in the DePaul Law 
Review article which lists several state bar economic surveys that had 
some information on income broken down by specialization; I used those 
data as an alternate way to estimate the effective hourly rates lawyers 
generate.69 One of the studies in the table was from Texas and was dated 
1992. Brickman is correct that the 1992 Texas study did not include the 
fee in the case he refers to, which was from a case settled in 1992; this is 
for the simple reason that the Texas study covered income for 1991.70 
However, there is nothing inconsistent between the data in the Texas study 
and the kind of fee Brickman reported for that particular case. If the study 
had covered 1992, it could well have included lawyers who earned $1.8 
 68. Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 9, at 695–96. 
 69. Kritzer, Wages of Risk, supra note 16, at 277–79. 
 70. STATE BAR OF TEX., 1992 ATTORNEY BILLING AND COMPENSATION SURVEY: ATTORNEY 
COMPENSATION REPORT 3 (1992). 
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million fees during that year. Either Brickman failed to understand how 
these summary statistics were created from the raw data, or he is so 
focused on his advocacy that he chose to ignore this detail in order to try 
to score points in the policy debate. 
C. Pain and Suffering 
Brickman asserts that “[p]ain and suffering damages are generally 
valued for settlement purposes as a two- to three-times multiple of medical 
costs.”71 Brickman bases this on a combination of a statement in Charles 
Wolfram’s textbook on legal ethics,72 and on data he misinterprets from a 
1987 insurance industry study.73 Specifically, Brickman states “[t]he 
operative ratios are $2.11 in pain and suffering recoveries for every dollar 
of medical and wage loss costs.”74 Brickman should reread the insurance 
industry report. The figure in the report is the ratio of total damages to 
economic loss, not the ratio of general damages (pain and suffering) to 
economic loss;75 this means that for 1987 (the year covered by the study 
that Brickman cites) the ratio of pain and suffering to economic loss was 
1.11 to 1. Moreover, Brickman either fails to realize or chooses not to 
reveal that the insurance industry organization has been doing these 
studies since the late 1970s, and the ratio has been falling since that time. 
A total of five studies have been completed (1977, 1987, 1992, 1997, and 
2002), and the ratios of total payment to economic loss (in bodily injury 
claims) over that time have been, in order, 2.29, 2.11, 1.87, 1.65, and 
1.49.76 That is, the data published by the IRC from its 2002 study shows 
an average Bodily Injury (“BI”) payment of $8,245 and an average 
“economic loss” of $5,520, which works out to a multiplier of only 1.49.77 
Interestingly, the actual average payment (in unadjusted dollars) declined 
 71. Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 9, at 674. 
 72. Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 9, at 675 n.59 (“Pain and suffering and similar 
nonmonetary damages probably average three times the monetary damages in personal injury claims.”) 
(quoting CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 528 n.21 (1986)). 
 73. Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 9, at 674 n.59 (construing ALL-INDUS. 
RESEARCH ADVISORY COUNCIL, COMPENSATION FOR AUTO. INJURIES IN THE U.S. 65–66 & tbl. 5-5 
(1989)). The payment and loss figures reported by AIRAC and its successor, the Insurance Research 
Council, omit cases involving permanent total disability and death. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See ALL-INDUS. RESEARCH ADVISORY COUNCIL, COMPENSATION FOR AUTO. INJURIES IN 
THE U.S. 66 (1989). 
 76. The ratios for all five years can be computed from data reported in INS. RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
AUTO INJURY INSURANCE CLAIMS: COUNTRYWIDE PATTERNS IN TREATMENT, COST, AND 
COMPENSATION 72 (2003). 
 77. Id. 
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between 1992 and 1997 from $8,460 to $7,836 (a drop of 7.4%); by 2002, 
the average payment was back up to $8,245, which was still less than 10 
years before.78 Adjusting for inflation, which the published IRC figures do 
not do, shows that the average payment in bodily injury cases dropped by 
24% between 1992 and 2002.79
I have also looked at jury verdict data from Wisconsin, where juries 
itemized damages, for the mid-1980s. These data show an average ratio of 
general damages to special damages of about 1 to 1 (equivalent to a total 
damages to special damages ratio of 2 to 1).80 Brickman might respond 
that this is just unrepresentative Wisconsin again; however, at my request 
Stephen Daniels81 looked at data from several jurisdictions in Texas where 
damages are routinely itemized and came up with comparable figures.82 
Moreover, in a recent article, W. Kip Viscusi notes that in a previous study 
of product liability cases that he had done, “[T]he elasticity of the 
responsiveness of pain and suffering damages to the compensatory amount 
to less than one”;83 that is, the ratio of pain and suffering to compensatory 
damages, to the extent there is such a ratio,84 is something less than one.85
D. Variation in Contingency-Fee Percentages 
Throughout his writing, and reasserted in his article in this law review, 
Brickman has maintained that contingency-fee percentages are 
 78. Id. 
 79. This figure is based on a CPI of 140.5 for July 1992 and 180.1 for July 2002. U.S. 
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bureau of Labor Statistics Data, available at 
http://www.bls.gov/data/home.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2004). Deflating the 2002 payment to 1992 
dollars yields $6,432 which is a decline of 24%. 
 80. Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingent-Fee Lawyers and Their Clients: Settlement Expectations, 
Settlement Realities, and Issues of Control in the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 23 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 795, 871 n.23 (1998). 
 81. Daniels answered my question by drawing on the data from the study he did with Joanne 
Martin, which assembled jury verdict data from 80 jurisdictions in 16 different states, including six 
jurisdictions in Texas. See DANIELS & MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES, supra note 57, at 84–86. 
 82. I discuss evidence regarding the ratio of general damages to special damages in an appendix 
to my article, Contingent-Fee Lawyers and Their Clients: Settlement Expectations, Settlement 
Realities, and Issues of Control in the Lawyer-Client Relationship, see Kritzer, supra note 80, at 817–
18. 
 83. W. Kip Viscusi, Tort Reform and Insurance Markets, 7 RISK MGMT. & INS. MARKETS 9, 12 
(2004). 
 84. Viscusi also comments that “jurors do not simply multiply the compensatory award by some 
factor such as 1.5.” Id. 
 85. It is important to note here that the study Professor Viscusi refers to looked at settlements and 
verdicts in products liability cases. See W. Kip Viscusi, Pain and Suffering in Product Liability Cases: 
Systematic Compensation or Capricious Awards? 8 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 203, 205 (1988). 
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“standardized” at 33% or more;86 his argument is that this demonstrates 
that contingency fees are not governed by the market and hence are 
noncompetitive.87 While I report no specific evidence that there is 
competition regarding contingency-fee percentages,88 in my article I report 
several studies—in addition to mine—that show substantial variation in 
contingency-fee percentages and that a significant portion of contingency 
fees are less than 33%. Thus, Brickman’s assertion that the tort bar has 
been effective “in administering a uniform price” is simply untrue.89
The only supposedly new evidence that Brickman advances that there 
is little variation in contingency-fee percentages is from a study by the 
IRC.90 Brickman reports that this study shows a median contingency-fee 
of 33% and a mean of 31% and that “the fees did not vary at all on the 
basis of how quickly a settlement was achieved.”91 This does not address 
the question of whether there was variation in fees, only whether variation 
related specifically to the timing of settlement. The data reported in this 
study, as well as the 1994 and 1999 editions of the same study (using data 
collected in 1992 and 1998 respectively), are very informative on the issue 
of variation in fee percentages. 
 86. Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 9, at 701–03. 
 87. Id.; see also Lester Brickman, The Market for Contingent Fee-Financed Tort Litigation: Is It 
Price Competitive? 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 65 (2003) [hereinafter, Brickman, The Market for 
Contingent Fee-Financed Tort Litigation]. 
 88. In my interviews of contingency-fee practitioners in Wisconsin, I did ask some of the lawyers 
whether they would take a case for a lower percentage if the case was one they were very interested in 
getting and they sensed that the client was lawyer shopping. The response was mixed; perhaps half of 
the respondents who addressed this question said they would offer a fee lower than their usual fee and 
half said they would not. However, the number of respondents who addressed this issue was too small 
to draw strong conclusions other than that some lawyers will offer reduced fees in the face of 
competition and some will not. Outside Wisconsin, I have seen at least one indicator of competition 
over fees in routine contingency fee work. The back of the Phoenix, Arizona yellow pages does boast a 
full-page advertisement from a personal-injury law firm that calls itself “The Discount Accident 
Lawyers,” a title that is trademarked. It indicates that the firm provides “full service & discounted fees. 
It’s about time.” The phrase “Discount Accident Lawyers” is prominently displayed on the firm’s 
webpage, which also explains that they charge 29% rather than the supposedly usual one-third. See 
Hastings & Hastings, P.C., Hastings & Hastings FAQ, at http://www.hastingsandhastings.com/faq-
hastings.htm#Q2 (last visited Mar. 6, 2004).  
 89. Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 9, at 702. 
 90. INS. RESEARCH COUNCIL, PAYING FOR AUTO INJURIES: A CONSUMER PANEL SURVEY OF 
AUTO ACCIDENT VICTIMS 2004 EDITION 39, 76 (2004) [hereinafter IRC, PAYING FOR AUTO INJURIES 
2004]. 
 91. Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 9, at 658 n.11(6). 
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TABLE 1: Fee Percentages from IRC Data 
Fee Percentage 
1992 & 1998    1998 & 2003 
1992 1998 1998 2003 
10% or less 5% 5%
11%-20% 4 5
19% or less 8% 5%
21%-25% 9 9
26%-30% 18 20
20%-29% 13 15
30%-34% 70% 67%
31%-35% 56 54
35%-75% 9 12
36-40% 7 5
41% or more 2 2
101%a 100% 100% 99%a
(n) 1322 1212 1253 705
aPercentages do not add to 100 due to rounding. 
Table 1 shows the responses reported by IRC to the survey question 
asking respondents about the fee they paid to their lawyers. The table 
shows that there is substantial variation in the percentages paid.92 
Importantly, the figures in the table are strikingly consistent with other 
data I have reported on contingency-fee percentages.93 Specifically, the 
most common percentage fee is 33% (or, as shown here, in the 31-35% or 
 
 
 92. See IRC, PAYING FOR AUTO INJURIES 1994, supra note 55, at 57; IRC, PAYING FOR AUTO 
INJURIES 1999, supra note 55, at 87; IRC, PAYING FOR AUTO INJURIES 2004, supra note 90, at 75. The 
1994 and 1999 reports provided relatively detailed breakdowns of the percentage fees (5% or less, 6–
10%, 11–15%, 16–20%, 21–25%, 26–30%, 31–35%, 36–40%, etc.) while the 2004 report provides 
only the categories shown in Table 1, which accounts for part of the difference in the two sets of 
figures for 1998 (the second 1998 column was reported in the 2004 report). Given that the 2004 
column is very similar to the 1998 column reported in the 2004 report, I infer that the detailed 
breakdown for 2002 is almost certainly very similar to that for 1998. The question asked did not 
change significantly between 1998 (which was the same as 1992) and 2004: “What payment 
arrangements were made for attorney services”; the answer alternative related to fee percentage did 
change very slightly, from “Contingency fee (percentage of award) (Specify percentage)” to “A 
percentage of the settlement or award (Specify Percentage),” but this is unlikely to greatly affect the 
responses. See IRC, PAYING FOR AUTO INJURIES 1999, supra note 55, at 106; IRC, PAYING FOR AUTO 
INJURIES 2004, supra note 90, at 84. There is no explanation for why the number of responses differ 
for the two sets of figures for 1998; one possibility is that the later report included multiple responses 
for some cases (for both 1998 and 2002 surveys, information could be provided by up to three people 
in the family who made claims in a given accident). One might speculate that the Insurance Research 
Council changed the level of detail to accord with Professor Brickman’s argument; Professor 
Brickman did have access to the IRC analysis long before it was published (my request to have 
advance access to information that would appear in the report prepublication was denied). 
 93. Kritzer, Seven Dogged Myths, supra note 8, at 755–61. 
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30-34% range), but there is significant variation around—and particularly 
below—that figure.  
E. The Contingencies of Contingency-Fee Work 
Throughout his writings on contingency fees, Brickman has taken the 
position that the only justification for any payment premium under a 
contingency-fee recovery is the risk of nonrecovery. In his first article he 
asserts, “for a contingent fee to be valid, there must be an actual 
contingency, which means a realistic risk of nonrecovery.”94 Now, 
Brickman has finally acknowledged that the risks involved in the 
contingency fee includes more than nonrecovery; however, he has largely 
continued to ignore the denominator for the effective hourly rate 
equation.95 That is, he acknowledges that not only can there be no 
recovery (the numerator can be zero) but there can also be a low recovery 
(the numerator can be small).96 What he continues to ignore is the 
uncertainty in the denominator: lawyers cannot know how much time a 
case will take because they do not know how the opposing side will 
respond to the settlement demand that they make.97 In some types of cases, 
e.g., medical malpractice, lawyers, at least those I have talked to, assume 
that there will be significant resistance even when they believe that the 
negligence is clear; uncontested cases do occur, but that is not the 
expectation that lawyers have when they take on a medical malpractice 
case. 
In his discussion of my writing about risk,98 Brickman neglects to note 
that I have always focused heavily on the risk involved in the 
denominator. I have never asserted that contingency-fee lawyers fail to 
recover in a very large percentage of cases (although a relatively low 
recovery rate does occur in some areas such as medical malpractice). 
Hence, he is wrong when he states that my “statement that contingency fee 
 94. Brickman, Contingent Fees, supra note 10, at 30. 
 95. To be fair, Brickman does acknowledge in a footnote that I argue that uncertainty over the 
amount of time that will be required needs to be considered among the contingencies faced by lawyers. 
See Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 9, at 696 n.149. Brickman asserts that he has also 
considered this issue. Id. at 656 n.8, 696 n.149 (citing Brickman, Contingent Fees, supra note 10, at 
97–98). I invite readers to review what Professor Brickman said in his 1989 article to assess for 
themselves whether he has really taken into account the uncertainties I label “investment risk.” 
 96. Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 9, at 656 n.149. 
 97. Kritzer, Seven Dogged Myths, supra note 8, at 748–49. 
 98. Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 9, at 696–97. 
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lawyers ‘face substantial risk’ is belied by [my] own research”; nor do I 
“recede from [my] prior statements about risks of nonrecovery.”99
V. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO ESTIMATING EFFECTIVE HOURLY 
RATES, OR GROWTH IN EFFECTIVE-HOURLY RATES 
Brickman asserts that my approach to measuring the return on 
contingency-fee work fails to produce valid data. He proposes three 
alternative ways of drawing inferences about these returns and attempts to 
apply two of them.100 In fact, I apply a variant of one of the approaches he 
describes (the one he does not attempt to apply); my results using that 
approach are consistent with the other approaches I have applied.101 The 
other two approaches that Brickman does attempt to apply are severely 
flawed for reasons I detail below. The flaws demonstrate Brickman’s 
failure to understand and apply the principles of social science research 
and his unwillingness to acknowledge the issues involved in drawing 
inferences from one type of data to another type of data. 
A. Estimating Effective Hourly Rates Through Aggregation 
In Appendix A of his article, Brickman suggests that “[t]he most direct 
way of calculating the increase in the effective hourly rate of tort lawyers 
would be to assemble total contingent-fee income data realized by plaintiff 
lawyers in personal injury litigation in each of the years 1960–2001 and 
divide that number by the number of hours contingent-fee lawyers devoted 
 99. Id. at 696–97 & n.149. These supposed prior statements are cited to my unpublished paper, 
KRITZER, RHETORIC AND REALITY, supra note 6, at 37. I invite readers to read what is in that paper. 
The bulk of the discussion is on medical malpractice where the risk of nonrecovery is substantial. The 
balance focuses on the risk of nonrecovery in filed cases; there I report an overall risk of nonrecovery 
of about 17%. KRITZER, RHETORIC & REALITY, supra note 6, at 20. If one assumes that less than half 
of cases are filed and that virtually all unfiled cases lead to recovery then the overall risk of 
nonrecovery is less than 10%. However, at least one publicly available dataset suggests a higher risk of 
nonrecovery. The Texas Department of Insurance publishes an annual report on closed commercial 
liability claims. See supra notes 34–35. The 2001 report shows a total of 151,344 closed claims only 
62,810 of which resulted in payments—for a recovery rate of 41.5%; the recovery rates ranged from a 
high of 57.5% in commercial auto-liability claims to a low of 16.7% in medical professional-liability 
claims. See TDI, 2001 CLOSED CLAIM ANN. REP., supra note 38, at 21, 28 (recovery rate percentages 
calculated from raw data provided in TDI Report). The figures above undoubtedly overstate the risk 
for contingency-fee lawyers because they include cases where the claimant had no lawyer; 
unfortunately, there is no way from the available data to separate out represented and unrepresented 
claimants because that information was collected only in regard to claims settling for more than 
$10,000 (i.e., there is no information on representation for claims where no payment was made). 
 100. Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 9, at 686–92. 
 101. This is what I refer to as the “mean hourly return,” see Kritzer, Seven Dogged Myths, supra 
note 8, at 761–72. 
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to all representations in those years.”102 What Brickman is calling for is a 
complete census of the population of contingency-fee cases, their 
outcomes, the fees earned, and the hours worked. As anyone familiar with 
inferential statistics knows, a full census is not necessary because valid 
and quite precise estimates of population figures can be obtained using 
appropriate random samples.103  
In fact, I do report some results that rely upon a methodology along the 
lines Brickman proposes. Specifically, I take all of the cases in my sample, 
add up all of the fees (adjusted for expenses that an hourly-fee lawyer 
would bill out separately), add up all the hours the lawyers reported 
devoting to the cases in the sample, and divide the first sum (fees) by the 
second sum (hours). I refer to this as the “mean hourly return.” I do this 
for both Wisconsin and the RAND CJRA data, and report them both in my 
Table 8.104 These figures range from $157 for 1992–93 federal cases to 
$274 for “high stakes” Wisconsin court cases; the figures are heavily 
influenced by the top 10% of cases and when I trim the top 10%, the range 
drops to $110-$181. 
In my recent book, I report comparable data from the 1979 Civil 
Litigation Research Project where the mean hourly return worked out to 
$47 ($51 for federal and $40 for state cases).105 Over the period from 1979 
through 1995 the CPI rose about 120%; during this period, the median 
hourly rate charged by lawyers working on an hourly basis rose from 
$50106 to about $125 (for a mean of $124).107 Thus, depending on which of 
the mean hourly return figures one chooses to focus on, the increase in 
mean hourly return for contingency-fee work over the 16 years from 1979 
to 1995 has either been just a bit greater than the CPI and the increase in 
hourly rates generally or about double that increase. While I cannot say 
which is the more accurate characterization, this is nothing like the 1000–
 102. Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 9, at 707. 
 103. The entire field of inferential statistics is built on this core foundation. Every elementary 
statistics book discusses how samples can be used to draw valid and relatively accurate inferences 
about populations; while the samples cannot give the exact population figures, they can provide 
estimates with known levels of likely errors. 
 104. Kritzer, Seven Dogged Myths, supra note 8, at 772. 
 105. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS, supra note 25, at 184–86. These same 
figures can be found in my unpublished paper, Kritzer, What Are Contingency Fees Really Like, supra 
note 26, at 13–14. 
 106. HERBERT M. KRITZER, THE JUSTICE BROKER: LAWYERS AND ORDINARY LITIGATION 138 
(1990).  
 107. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS, supra note 25, at 186. 
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1400% increase that Brickman wants to suggest, unless most of that 
increase occurred between 1960 and 1980.108
B. What Do Jury Verdicts Tell Us about Growth in Payouts and Hence, 
Contingency Fees? 
One of Brickman’s arguments is that typical contingency fees must 
have risen radically over the last 40 years because there has been radical 
growth in average jury verdicts—even controlling for inflation.109 There 
are several problems with using average jury verdicts as a surrogate 
measure for typical contingency fees. 
First, throughout his discussion, Brickman relies mostly on arithmetic 
means to describe jury verdicts. From the viewpoint of those receiving or 
effectively paying these fees (insurance companies in tort cases), the mean 
is an important statistic because what payers (and payees) are most 
interested in is the total payout, and the total payout can be obtained by 
multiplying the arithmetic mean times the number of cases. However, 
from the viewpoint of policy analysis directed at how a system operates, 
medians are probably more important because one wants to focus on what 
typical juries are doing in typical cases.110 In this area, means fail to 
describe typical cases because of the extreme skew caused by a small 
number of extreme outliers, which is why I report results with and without 
a 10% top trim. 
A second problem is that Brickman relies largely on data collected by 
Jury Verdict Research (“JVR”).111 I know of no social scientist who has 
studied jury verdict patterns who will use data from JVR because of the 
unscientific way JVR assembles its information.112 The three best studies 
of jury verdicts either rely upon jury verdict reporters that have systems in 
place to capture most verdicts within the jurisdictions they cover or 
involve systematic sampling of verdict reports directly from court files. 
These studies are the series done by the RAND Institute for Civil Justice 
focusing on California and Cook County, Illinois;113 the study by Daniels 
 108. Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 9, at 655, 714. 
 109. Id. at 707–14. 
 110. See DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., TRENDS IN TORT LITIGATION: THE STORY BEHIND THE 
STATISTICS 12–13 (1987). 
 111. Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 9, at 708–13. 
 112. One social scientist I spoke to about JVR commented, “I can wax poetic about that crap.” 
 113. For the most recent publication from the long series of RAND reports on this research, see 
Seth Seabury et al., Forty Years of Civil Jury Verdicts, 1 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 8 (2004) 
[hereinafter Seabury, Forty Years of Civil Jury Verdicts]. Earlier work includes: AUDREY CHIN & 
MARK PETERSON, DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY POCKETS: WHO WINS IN COOK COUNTY JURY TRIALS 
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and Martin which looks at 80 jurisdictions in 16 states around the 
country;114 and the studies of 45 of the largest 75 counties in 1992, 1996, 
and 2001 conducted for the Bureau of Justice Statistics.115 A number of 
scholars have criticized the JVR data. Stephen Daniels and Joanne Martin 
have stated: 
The JVR data . . . are alleged to be national figures and are widely 
cited as such. The reliability and validity of these data, however, are 
questionable. JVR’s coverage is highly selective, reporting on what 
it determines to be precedent setting verdicts. The coverage is thus 
biased toward high awards, and is not reported in constant 
dollars. . . . [N]o context is provided within which to interpret these 
data. No information is given on the total number of verdicts, nor on 
the proportion of plaintiff verdicts. This lack of context is especially 
problematic with regard to trends in the number of $1 million-plus 
awards.116
Likewise, Michael J. Saks has stated in The University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review: 
Although practitioners sometimes turn for information about awards 
to reports from Jury Verdict Research (JVR), no serious students of 
the litigation system regard those data as reliable summaries of jury 
behavior. The JVR data are not the product of systematic and 
representative sampling. The resulting sample of awards is taken 
(1985); AUBREY CHIN & MARK A. PETERSON, FAIRNESS IN CIVIL JURY TRIALS: WHO WINS, WHO 
LOSES IN COOK COUNTY (1983); ERIK MOLLER, EXPLAINING VARIATION IN PERSONAL INJURY JURY 
AWARDS (1997); ERIK MOLLER, TRENDS IN CIVIL JURY VERDICTS SINCE 1985 (1996); MARK A. 
PETERSON, CIVIL JURIES IN THE 1980S: TRENDS IN JURY TRIALS AND VERDICTS IN CALIFORNIA AND 
COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS (1987); MARK A. PETERSON, COMPENSATION OF INJURIES: CIVIL VERDICTS 
IN COOK COUNTY (1983); MARK A. PETERSON ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
(1987); MARK A. PETERSON & GEORGE L. PRIEST, THE CIVIL JURY: TRENDS IN TRIALS AND 
VERDICTS, COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, 1960–1979 (1982); MICHAEL SHANLEY & MARK A. PETERSON, 
COMPARATIVE JUSTICE: CIVIL JURY VERDICTS IN SAN FRANCISCO AND COOK COUNTIES, 1959–1980 
(1983); MICHAEL SHANLEY & MARK A. PETERSON, POSTTRIAL ADJUSTMENTS TO JURY AWARDS 
(1987); Erik Moller et al., Punitive Damages in Financial Injury Jury Verdicts, 28 J. OF LEGAL 
STUDIES 283 (1999). 
 114. DANIELS & MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES, supra note 57, at 84–86 (selected jurisdictions were 
included from Arizona, California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, New 
York, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, and Washington, plus all of Alaska, Idaho, and Montana). 
 115. COHEN & SMITH, CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES 2001, supra note 
41 (the 2001 study was expanded to 46 counties); DEFRANCES & LITRAS, CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND 
VERDICTS, supra note 41; DEFRANCES ET AL., CIVIL JURY CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES 
(1995) [hereinafter DEFRANCES ET AL., CIVIL JURY CASES]. 
 116. Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Jury Verdicts and the “Crisis” in Civil Justice, 11 JUST. 
SYS. J. 321, 327 (1986). 
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disproportionately from the high end of the distribution, and the 
resulting summary statistics therefore overstate the size of awards. 
In addition, reporting practices may vary with geography, case type, 
and over time, such as when public controversy over awards rises. 
As a result, apparent changes in award patterns [according to the 
JVR data] may reflect little more than changes in reporting patterns 
and changes in the nature of the sampling bias.117
Finally, Rachel Zimmerman and Christopher Oster stated in a June 2004 
Wall Street Journal article: 
Jury Verdict Research says its 2,951-case malpractice database has 
large gaps. It collects award information unsystematically, and it 
can’t say how many cases it misses. It says it can’t calculate the 
percentage change in the median for childbirth-negligence cases. 
More important, the database excludes trial victories by doctors and 
hospitals—verdicts that are worth zero dollars. That’s a lot to 
ignore. Doctors and hospitals win about 62% of the time, Jury 
Verdict Research says. A separate database on settlements is less 
comprehensive. A spokesman for Jury Verdict Research, Gary 
Bagin, confirms these and other holes in its statistics.118
As indicated by the above quotes, JVR has been a passive receiver of 
jury verdict information; while JVR’s data are national in scope, JVR does 
not conduct sampling in anything that looks like a scientific way. JVR 
relies in significant part on lawyers and other informants to tell it about 
cases. The result is that JVR overestimates both plaintiff wins and verdict 
amounts. It also fails to account for the large number of bench trials. For 
example, Brickman refers to an average verdict of $1,365,110 for 2001.119 
The Bureau of Justice Statistics study of 45 of the 75 largest counties 
found that in 1996 the average tort award was $430,359, up from $407,875 
for 1992.120 Interestingly, this study shows a sharp drop in the median 
 117. Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Liability 
System–and Why Not? 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1245–46 (1992) [hereinafter Saks, Do We Really 
Know Anything]. 
 118. Rachel Zimmerman & Christopher Oster, Assigning Liability: Insurers’ Missteps Helped 
Provoke Malpractice “Crisis”, WALL ST. J., June 24, 2002, at A1. The article goes on to report that 
Bagin said, “[T]he numbers nevertheless accurately reflect trends. The company, which sells its data to 
all comers, has reported jury information this way since 1961. ‘If we changed now, people looking 
back historically couldn’t compare apples to apples,’ Mr. Bagin says.” Id. 
 119. Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 9, at 708. 
 120. DEFRANCES & LITRAS, CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND VERDICTS, supra note 41, at 8; DEFRANCES 
ET AL., CIVIL JURY CASES, supra note 115, at 5. The 2001 Bureau of Justice Statistics (“BJS”) study 
does not provide sufficient information to calculate separate means for jury and bench trials; the 
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award and slight drops in the means for auto injuries and medical 
malpractice cases from 1992 to 1996.121 Importantly, as noted 
previously,122 Brickman argues that urban areas should produce higher 
average verdicts than nonurban areas; if this is true, one would expect a 
study focusing on the large urban counties to produce a higher mean 
verdict than a true national sample. 
This is not to say that there has not been substantial growth in mean 
verdicts. The best long term data—that collected by RAND for Cook and 
San Francisco counties—shows growth on the order of 400–500% from 
1960 to 2000 after controlling for inflation. At the same time, those studies 
show at best modest growth in median verdicts (50–100%) over the same 
time period.123  
Even granting that there has been growth, it is not at all clear what this 
growth tells us about changes in cases that do not go to verdict. There is 
strong evidence that the mix of cases being tried has changed substantially 
over the last forty years.124 In many jurisdictions the number of civil trials 
has declined not just relative to the number of cases being filed but in 
absolute numbers.125 The RAND research has shown that the number of 
tort trials in San Francisco has fallen by about two-thirds over the 40 year 
period covered by the research. Statistical analysis of jury verdicts in the 
RAND study indicates that once one controls case characteristics and 
overall average tort award in 2001 was $565,238 (in unadjusted dollars)—less than half the figure 
reported by JVR for that same year (computed from COHEN & SMITH, CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND 
VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 2001, supra note 41, at 5). I obtained the raw BJS data from the Inter-
university Consortium for Political and Social Research and computed the mean tort verdict for jury 
trials; the result was $597,000. See Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, 
Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, 2001, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, available 
at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/access/index.html (last visited Sept. 2004). The 2001 BJS report does 
show median jury award amounts in tort cases adjusted for inflation declining from $64,000 in 1992 to 
$28,000 in 2001 and a decline is evident even using unadjusted dollars (from $51,000 in 1992 to 
$30,000 in 1996 to $28,000 in 2001). See COHEN & SMITH, CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND VERDICTS IN 
LARGE COUNTIES, 2001, supra note 41, at 9. Comparing the overall (combining bench and jury trials) 
means for 1996 to those for 2001 (using unadjusted dollars) does show an increase in average tort 
awards over the period. 
 121. DEFRANCES & LITRAS, CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND VERDICTS, supra note 41, at 8. I computed 
the means for auto injuries and medical malpractice from the 2001 study. The mean for auto injury 
cases was up slightly from 1996, but still below the mean for 1992. For medical malpractice cases, the 
mean in 2001 went up sharply to $2,040,000 from $1,319,000 in 1996 and $1,484,000 in 1992. See 
COHEN & SMITH, CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 2001, supra note 41, at 9.  
 122. See supra notes 53–58 and accompanying text. 
 123. See Seabury, Forty Years of Civil Jury Verdicts, supra note 113, at 9. 
 124. See Neil Vidmar, Making Inferences about Jury Behavior from Jury Verdict Statistics: 
Cautions about the Lorelei’s Lied. 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 599 (1994); Saks, Do We Really Know 
Anything, supra note 117, at 1262–67. 
 125. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in 
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss2/5
P477 Kritzer article book pages.doc 12/22/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
2004] A REPLY TO PROFESSOR BRICKMAN 503 
 
 
 
 
 
 
inflation, the average jury verdict has actually declined over the last 40 
years.126 Looking separately at auto torts and other torts, one finds a 
decrease in verdicts for auto cases and an increase for nonauto torts; the 
cumulative increase over the 40 years for the latter is about 90%.127 It is 
probably the case that much of this increase in nonauto torts comes from 
business torts, which hardly existed 40 years ago. 
The conclusion one must draw from the preceding discussion is that 
one cannot make inferences from raw jury patterns to the full range of 
cases handled on a contingency (or any) fee basis. Furthermore, even if 
one acknowledges growth in the mean verdict, the absence of significant 
growth in the median verdict undercuts the argument that typical effective 
hourly rates have grown radically over the past 40 years. 
C. Estimating Effective Hourly Rates by Comparing to Defense Costs 
Brickman attempts to provide his own estimate of effective hourly rates 
by drawing comparisons between plaintiff and defense costs and fees.128 
His method of estimating the average effective hourly rate is to take the 
ratio of total plaintiff fees to total defense fees from a Joint Economic 
Committee study of auto accident compensation129 and then multiply by 
the average hourly rate he estimates is paid to defense lawyers ($140–
$150). The central problem in the analysis is that Brickman has incorrectly 
assumed that in every case where there is a plaintiffs’ lawyer there is also 
a defense lawyer; he neglects the fact that insurers do not bring in a 
defense lawyer in most cases until a suit is filed.130 A second problem is 
that the total amount paid to plaintiffs’ lawyers is derived by assuming an 
average contingency fee of 30%, which, while described as 
“conservative”,131 may well be too high. Finally, Brickman assumes that 
the amount of effort put in by defense lawyers is equal to that put in by 
plaintiffs’ lawyers; for cases that settle relatively soon after filing, this is 
unlikely to be the case. The extrapolation method Brickman uses to arrive 
 126. Seabury, Forty Years of Civil Jury Verdicts, supra note 113, at 19. 
 127. Id. at 21. 
 128. Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 9, at 686–92. 
 129. DAN MILLER, JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 108TH CONG., CHOICE IN AUTO INSURANCE: 
UPDATED SAVINGS ESTIMATES FOR AUTO CHOICE (2003), available at http://www.house.gov/jec/tort/ 
07-24-03.pdf. 
 130. See H. LAURENCE ROSS, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE 
CLAIMS ADJUSTMENT (1980); KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS, supra note 25, at 131–
34. 
 131. MILLER, JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 108TH CONG., supra note 129, at 15. 
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at an estimate of effective hourly rates earned by the plaintiffs’ bar simply 
does not work. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Professor Lester Brickman simply does not get it. He does not 
understand the data I present. He does not abide by the norms of 
scholarship. And, most decidedly, he does not like what my research 
shows about the reality of contingency fee legal practice in the United 
States. Ironically, there are results that I present that could be used to 
support an argument that contingency fees have increased over time; 
however, rather than understand those results, Professor Brickman prefers 
to attack and at times he seems to attack blindly.132
Professor Brickman wants to argue that contingency fees are not 
adequately governed by market mechanisms and hence need to be 
regulated.133 The support for this argument is that fees do not vary 
significantly (which I have shown to be untrue, even using data that 
Professor Brickman tries to cite in support of this argument) and that 
lawyers routinely obtain windfall fees (again, not consistent with any of 
the data I have been able to locate). Still, it might be the case that 
contingency fees are not competitive, and in fact I have suggested that the 
solution—if fees are noncompetitive—is to improve the market. This can 
be done in two ways: increasing the amount of information available to 
consumers about variations in the fees that lawyers charge and introducing 
competition from licensed, nonlawyer claims negotiators who would, if 
the fees are noncompetitive, be able to offer their services below the 
allegedly noncompetitive fees charged by lawyers.134
 132. The last direct contact I had with Professor Brickman was a brief email exchange in June of 
2003. In commenting on a series of petitions filed by an organization called Common Good calling on 
state supreme courts to impose limits on contingency fees, Professor Brickman is reported as having 
told the reporter that “about 20 states have rules limiting attorney fees in contingency cases to one-
third of the recovery.” Daniel Wise, Attorney Fees in Personal Injury Cases Are Targeted: A Move for 
Contingency Fee Caps in Quick Settlements, NAT’L L.J., May 12, 2003, at 6. Via email, I asked 
Professor Brickman if he could provide me with a list of those states and citations to the rules or 
statutes imposing the limitations. I was very interested in seeing this list because a law student had just 
completed a search for me of state statutes, cases, and ethics rules for every state trying to identify all 
limitation and regulations on contingency fees. The student had found virtually no limitations of the 
type Professor Brickman had claimed existed. If the student had botched the assignment, I wanted to 
know. Professor Brickman replied to my inquiry, “Sorry. I do not have a current list.” Email from 
Lester Brickman to Herbert M. Kritzer (June 30, 2003) (on file with author). Is there such a list, 
current or otherwise? On what basis did Professor Brickman make the claim? Or, did the reporter 
misquote Professor Brickman? If so, why did he not say so in his reply? 
 133. See Brickman, The Market for Contingent Fee-Financed Tort Litigation, supra note 87. 
 134. See KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS, supra note 25, at 263–64; Kritzer, 
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Brickman asserts that he has no problem with contingency fees, even 
extremely large contingency fees, when the risks that lawyers undertake 
are large. This is evident when he picks up on the fact that I acknowledge 
that some lawyers working on contingency fees do in fact earn very high 
hourly returns, e.g., the $300 (or perhaps $400) million contingency fee 
Texas lawyer Joe Jamail is reported to have earned in the Pennzoil vs. 
Texaco135 case. Brickman goes on to defend Jamail’s huge fee on the 
grounds of the high level of nonrecovery risk Jamail faced: “it [the fee] 
was ethically justified by the substantial risk he faced when he undertook 
the case and the amount of effort he reasonably anticipated at the time that 
he would have to expend.”136 Interesting—why then has Brickman, a 
vehement critic of the fees received by lawyers in tobacco cases, been 
unwilling to acknowledge that the very high fees received by the lawyers 
in the initial tobacco cases brought on behalf of states were not justified by 
“the substantial risk [they] faced when [they] undertook the case and the 
amount of effort [they] reasonably anticipated at the time that [they] would 
have to expend”?137 Why does Joe Jamail deserve his huge fee while the 
lawyers representing states like Minnesota (which settled at the end of a 
trial but before the jury returned a verdict), Florida, or Mississippi (both of 
which settled before trial) do not? Besides Joe Jamail, is there any very 
large contingency fee, particularly one involving an injured person or an 
injured group of persons (as opposed to a business tort such as in the 
Texaco case) that Professor Brickman would deem justified? 
I am sure that Professor Brickman would ask me in return whether I 
know of any contingency fees that I would deem excessive. The answer to 
that is yes. The New York Times reported a case in which a death claim 
had produced a settlement offer of $1.4 million to an unrepresented widow 
and her two children. A lawyer named Joseph Dowd approached the 
claimant after this settlement offer had been received and offered his 
Wages of Risk, supra note 16, at 307–08. 
 135. Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 9, at 692–93. See also, Andrew Blum, The 
$400 Million Man?, NAT’L L.J. at 2 (Sept. 26, 1988). 
 136. Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates, supra note 9, at 692–93. 
 137. See also Lester Brickman, The Tobacco Litigation and Attorneys’ Fees, 67 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2827 (1999); Lester Brickman, Want to Be a Billionaire? Sue a Tobacco Company, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 30, 1998, at A11; Lester Brickman, Will Legal Ethics Go Up in Smoke?, WALL ST. J., June 16, 
1998, at A18. In his June 16, 1998, Wall Street Journal piece, Brickman did state “When lawyers first 
brought suits against Big Tobacco, they were taking significant risks. For that they deserve to be richly 
compensated.” Id. However, he goes on to argue, post hoc, that the risks really weren’t all that big or 
that the contingency-fee contracts were sweetheart deals with corrupt politicians and hence were 
producing excessive fees. Id. Nowhere that I have been able to find does Brickman ever suggest that 
any of the fees actually received by lawyers in tobacco cases were warranted—not even the fee in the 
Minnesota case. 
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services; she retained him, and he referred the case to Corboy & Demetrio, 
one of the top plaintiffs’ firms in Chicago. Two years later the widow’s 
lawyer at Corboy & Demetrio advised her to settle the case for the $1.4 
million offered before any lawyer was retained. Mr. Dowd, the lawyer 
with whom she signed the retainer and who referred the case to Corboy & 
Demetrio, demanded payment of the fee called for in the retainer even 
though the representation he arranged had provided nothing for the widow. 
I would deem Mr. Dowd’s demand for his fee unethical even though 
Illinois courts have ruled that, given the terms of the contingency fee 
contract, it is legal. It is important to note that Corboy & Demetrio did 
waive any fee to which it was legally entitled.138
A more general example would be a case where there is clear fault and 
a relatively low policy limit producing an obvious limits claim (in 
Wisconsin, such a claim could involve a $100,000 insurance policy limit 
in a wrongful death claim arising from an accident caused by an 
intoxicated driver) and where all that the plaintiff’s attorney must do to be 
successful is to present evidence of conviction for DUI and the death 
certificate of the deceased, a $33,333 contingency fee would clearly be 
excessive and unethical. One prominent lawyer I spoke with volunteered 
the hypothetical example of the clear limits case with relatively low limits 
of $100,000, and said that in those circumstances he would charge the 
client a fee of 5% or less (i.e., $5,000) rather than his usual 33%.139 
However, Professor Brickman might argue that even this fee, or virtually 
any fee, would be unethical because all that the family of the deceased 
should have to do is to present the same materials to collect the policy 
limits. In the course of my research, one of the lawyers I observed told me 
of precisely this kind of case, but the twist was that the insurance company 
refused to pay the full policy limits. The company argued to the claimant 
that by settling directly with him/her, she/he would not have to pay a 
lawyer. In fact, under Wisconsin law concerning loss of consortium 
resulting from wrongful death, the client should have received the policy 
 138. Adam Liptak, Ethical Questions Raised on Legal Fee from Widow, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 
2004, at A4. 
 139. See KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS, supra note 25, at 41. An interesting 
question is whether alternative providers would be able to provide services at a lower cost than 
lawyers—particularly if those providers were subject to licensing and insurance rules. See HERBERT 
M. KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY: LAWYERS AND NONLAWYERS AT WORK 206–07 (1998). In a totally 
different arena, childbirth services, there is some evidence that alternative providers, midwife-staffed 
birthing centers, are failing in part because of increasing costs related to insurance. See Richard Pérex-
Peña, A Childbirth Phenomenon Fades: Use of Midwives Declines in New York as Insurance Costs 
Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2004, at A21. 
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limits of $300,000;140 the insurance company initially offered a settlement 
of $50,000 and eventually agreed to a settle with the claimant for 
$235,000 rather than paying the full $300,000 the claimant was legally 
entitled to. I would agree with Professor Brickman that in this case it 
would be unethical for a lawyer to charge fee of $100,000. What fee 
would be reasonable? One could argue that the client would be better off 
paying virtually any fee (including expenses) up to the difference in what 
the insurer would pay in the absence of representation. 
Professor Brickman has been an advocate for limitations on the 
contingency fees that lawyers can charge. He has argued that such 
limitations are necessary because lawyers routinely obtain excessive fees 
and seldom face significant risk in taking on contingency-fee cases. He has 
maintained his position in the face of systematically-collected data that fail 
to support the core assumptions of his proposal. Rather than undertaking 
the hard work of designing and executing research that would produce 
better data—that does not suffer from the issues of unrepresentativeness 
that he argues, incorrectly, undercut the data I rely upon—he presents 
dubious analyses that misinterpret and misapply extant data. Moreover, he 
relies upon data sources that social scientists from many institutions have 
long known to fall short of meeting the norms of sampling and data 
collection required to achieve validity. The kind of research required to 
obtain valid and useful data is difficult and time consuming, but it is the 
only way to develop a picture of how something like the American 
contingency fee operates on a day-to-day basis.  
 140. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.04(4) (West 2000). 
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